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I. Introduction to the Conflict of Interest Problem
The drafters of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act'
faced the formidable task of restructuring the regulation of private
pension plans throughout America. It would be unreasonable to assume
that all of the problems inherent to the pre-ERISA pension system
would be resolved by the ERISA enactment and its 1976 amendments.
While Congress did take great steps to establish uniform guidelines im-
posing fiduciary standards over the plan trustee, 2 it failed to curb all
trustee misconduct.
This note centers on section 408(c)(3) of ERISA,3 a provision
which permits corporate officers to act as trustees to ERISA pension
plans. Because of the enactment of section 408(c)(3), the potential for
conflicts of interest exists for corporate trustees whose loyalties are di-
vided between the administration of the pension trust fund and the
company's business interests. This problem will continue to expose
ERISA pension plan assets to loss of funds at the hands of an officer/
trustee, who because of his loyalty to his corporation disregards his du-
ties to plan participants. Indeed, an original drafter of ERISA noted
that "even now, despite ERISA, the temptation of parties-in-interest to
attempt to manipulate the assets of Employee Pension Funds for their
own personal or institutional advantage is very great, and especially
great when funds for making capital investment or serving other corpo-
rate objectives are in short supply."'4
1. Hereinafter referred to as ERISA.
2. See infra notes 23-51 and accompanying text.
3. ERISA § 408(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (1982).
4. Retirement Income Incentives Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 1541 Before the
Sub. Comm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 97 Cong., I Sess.
846-54 (1982)(statement by Michael S. Gordon).
In fact, Congress was aware of numerous examples of "party-in-interest" corrup-
tion and abuse prior to ERISA. Accordingly, Michael S. Gordon, an original drafter of
ERISA, recalled the following conflict of interest involving Genesco, Inc.:
In 1962 Genesco, Inc. used its employee pension fund to acquire Flagg-
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Section 404 of ERISA, the fiduciary standards section, represents
one-half of the dual loyalty that the officer faces and this section com-
mands him to disregard his obligations to the management of the cor-
poration (the second half of his dual loyalty) and act in a prudent fash-
ion to the pension plan." In application it is likely that section
408(c)(3) requires the officer/trustee to ignore corporate profit maxi-
mizing goals to better serve the ERISA trust participants.' This artifi-
cial expectation asks the officer/trustee to exchange the proverbial ac-
tivist derby worn by the corporate manager for the more conservative
top hat belonging to Cardozo's prudent man.7 This role change from
Utica Corp., a knitwear manufacturing concern. Flagg-Utica wanted
Genesco stock rather than cash for cash payment to its stockholders would
have been taxable immediately. But rather than buy on the open market,
Genesco dipped into the pension fund for 150,000 shares; it paid the fund
$5,250,000, or an average between the high and low Big Board quotes on
the day chosen for the transaction. By buying the stock from its pension
fund, Genesco probably saved money; if the company had bought so heav-
ily on the stock exchange the market price per share probably would have
climbed, increasing the cost of the purchase. And because management
controlled the fund, Genesco kept control of the $5,250,000; that sum re-
mained available for further acquisitions. Subsequently, Genesco agreed
with the SEC that it would restrict transactions in Genesco securities on
behalf of its Employee Stock Bonus Trust and pension plan as well as re-
stricting purchase by the Company from the stock bonus or pension plans
during negotiations with other companies. Again, the IRS never sought to
challenge the tax-exempt basis of the Genesco pension funds on the basis
of the prohibited transaction rules in the IRS tax regulations that then
existed. Subsequently, hearings before this Subcommittee disclosed that
Genesco had used pension fund assets to finance similar corporate acquisi-
tions, involving complex real estate leaseback transactions. Ultimately,
some of these transactions resulted in serious losses to the plan.
Id. at 853, citing Private Welfare and Pension Plan Study,.1971, Part II, Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Labor of the U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 599 et seq.
5. ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982).
6. With primary emphasis on a profit maximization goal, the aspiring corporate
officer may take actions and make decisions in a manner that would be judged impru-
dent under § 404 ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104. See generally R. BREALEY AND S. MEY-
ERS, Principles of Corporate Finance 637-47 (1981).
7. See S. REP. No. 93-127 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4639, 4680-841, 5073-84. Judge Mishler, in Donovan v. Bierwith,
538 F. Supp. 463, 470 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), modified, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982)(quoting Chief Judge Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon,
249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928)), observed:
[M]any forms of conduct permissible in a work a day world for those act-
[Vol. 9
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corporate officer to the prudent trustee cannot reasonably occur without
traces of corporate profit maximizing goals impacting upon each invest-
ment decision by the officer/trustee. A conflict of interest occurs when
the officer/trustee succumbs to prudent corporate investment decisions
that are deemed imprudent under ERISA. This note examines this
dual loyalty problem.8 First, this discussion concerns the historical
background to ERISA's fiduciary standards section. Second, the focus
centers on the fiduciary standard section. Third, the discussion of the
dual loyalty problem turns to common business conditions that create
conflict of interest. Fourth, in contrast to the dual loyalty problem, the
note examines a standard of review that gauges an officer/trustee's ad-
ministrative decisions. After a consideration of this standard, the study
reviews the potential for inadequate compensation to plan participants
resulting from fiduciary breach. Finally, this note advocates the repeal
ing at arm's length are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trus-
tee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. 'Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the
standard of behavior.' As to this there has been a tradition that is unbend-
ing and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of
courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty
by the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions.
Id.
8. The cases discussed in this note involve two types of ERISA pension plans: (1)
the profit sharing plan and (2) the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP or Quali-
fied Pension Plan). The court in Durkee v. Welch, 49 F.2d 339, 341 (S.D. Cal. 1931),
defines a profit sharing plan as follows:
Profit sharing ordinarily signifies the participation of employees with their
employer in a given share of the profits of an enterprise by reason of their
labor and not by reason of their capital investment therein. . . . The gen-
eral understanding of a profit-sharing arrangement between employers and
workers is that the worker shall share in the earnings and profits of his
employer, but is not accountable or liable for losses or deficits in the busi-
ness, and there is also, generally, present in profit-sharing transactions the
element of contribution by the employer to the project.
Id.
See the definition of an ESOP in I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7) (1985), which provides for "a
qualified stock bonus plan, or a combination stock bonus plan/money purchase pension
plan, that invests in 'qualified employer securities.'" See generally, 29 CFR §
2550.407d-6(l)(1984). All of the examples of fiduciary breach in the following cases
concern an officer/trustees' investment in equity securities, as opposed to debt instru-
ments. While it is possible for an officer/trustee to invest in certain debentures, that
investment is subject to the Internal Revenue Code's standards set forth in sections
503(e) and 4975(e)(8). Therefore, this note will not discuss the prudency of an officer/
trustee's decision to invest in a debt instrument.
1985]
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of section 408(c)(3) by Congress, and its substitution with a two-tiered
investment counseling requirement based on a formula that considers
the number of employees and the total assets in the plan.9
II. Historical Background to ERISA's Fiduciary Standards
Section
Congress passed ERISA in response to years of abuse in the area
of private pension and welfare plans.10 The Act's fiduciary standards
section made "applicable the law of trusts . . . [and] established uni-
form fiduciary standards which prevent transactions that dissipate or
endanger plan assets, and provide effective remedies for breaches of
trust."" Historically, misconduct by trustees in the administration of
pension trusts often resulted in the dissipation of plan assets.'2 Based
on the amount of asset dissipation, the plans lost their tax exempt sta-
tus, and the I.R.S. imposed penalties which were felt most severely by
plan participants and beneficiaries who found their distributions dimin-
ished by an even greater tax burden. 13 In some cases, the entire retire-
ment benefit dissipated as a result of trustee mismanagement.' 4 Prior to
the enactment of ERISA, Congress had examined these problems asso-
ciated with the administration of private pension funds.' 5 In an attempt
to ameliorate these problems, Congress enacted the Welfare and Pen-
sion Disclosure Act in 1958,16 and enacted the Labor Management Re-
porting Act (Landrum-Griffin Act) in 1959.17 Both acts failed to pro-
vide adequate legislative regulation over a pension trustee's fiduciary
responsibility to plan participants and their beneficiaries' assets.'8 In-
9. See infra note 169.
10. S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 5186 (Statement of Sen. Harrison Williams).
11. Id.
12. 19B Business Organizations, S. Young, Pension and Profit Sharing Plans §
17.0111].
13. See S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4639, 4642-43.
14. See supra n.12.
15. See S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 4640-41.
16. Priv. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958) amended by Priv. L. No. 87-420,
76 Stat. 35 (1962).
17. Priv. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959).
18. See S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4639, 4642-43.
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stead of direct fiduciary regulation, Congress left the door open for
courts to develop common-law trust principles that would constitute the
standards by which a plan trustee would be held responsible to pension
participants and their beneficiaries.19
The drafters of ERISA understood that more precise and stricter
fiduciary standards were necessary to safeguard qualified pension fund
assets.20 Therefore, in 1974, the drafters succeeded in pursuading Con-
gress to recognize that neither the individual states nor the federal gov-
ernment safeguarded employee benefit plan assets from such abuses as
self-dealing, imprudent investing and misappropriation of plan funds.21
With these policy interests in mind, Congress approved the fiduciary
standard section of ERISA, and enacted a uniform standard for trust-
ees in the specialized field of employee benefit plans.22
III. The Fiduciary Standards Section and Codified Exceptions
As private pension plans grew in popularity, Congress recognized
the need to regulate a trustee's fiduciary relationship to plan partici-
pants.23 Section 404,24 the ERISA fiduciary standards section, signifies
Congress' policy concerns towards curbing runaway trustee misman-
agement and misconduct.25 This section requires that every duty car-
ried out by a plan trustee must be "performed with respect to a plan
solely in the interest of the plan participants and for the exclusive pur-
pose of (i) providing benefits to the participants and beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan. '26 The
drafters of ERISA designed this fiduciary standard section based on a
19. See Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 635 (W.D. Wis.
1979). See also S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 5186 (Statement of Sen. Harrison Williams).
20. S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWs 4680-841, 5073-84.
21. Id. at 4839-43.
22. Marshall v. Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust, 458 F. Supp. 986, 990-92
(E.D.N.Y. 1978).
23. See, S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4639, 4680-841, 5073-84.
24. See Retirement Income Incentives Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 1541 Before
the Sub. Comm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 97 Cong., 1
Sess. 846-54 (1982)(statement by Michael S. Gordon).
25. See S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 4680-841, 5073-84.
26. ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982).
19851
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model that combines the prudent man rule established of common-law
trust and a modern supplement to common-law trust, the diversification
rule. -7
A. Ambiguity Surrounding the Prudent Man Rule and Diversi-
fication Requirement
The court in Harvard College v. Armory, 8 established the com-
mon-law standard that now exists in codified form as the prudent man
rule. This rule provides that a trustee:
shall conduct himself faithfully and exercise a sound discre-
tion .... [H]e is to observe how men of prudence, discretion and
intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation,
but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, consider-
ing the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capi-
tal to be invested.2 9
Congress modified this common-law standard when it enacted its statu-
tory form in section 404(a)(1)(B) of ERISA. Accordingly, an ERISA
plan fiduciary must discharge his investment duties: "with the care,
skill and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a pru-
dent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters
would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with
like aims."30
27. S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4639, 5084-85.
28. 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830) (excusing trustee from liability for investing
in trade company stock).
29. Id. at 461.
30. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (1982). Section 1104
dealing with ERISA's Fiduciary Standards provides:
(a)(1) Subject to sections 1103(c) and (d), 13423, and 1344 of this title,
a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and -
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill prudence, and diligence under the circum-
stances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matter would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a
like character and with like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the
[Vol. 9
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The ERISA plan officer/trustee, abiding by the prudent man rule,
must make investments consonant to the stated security level of the
trust.31 Often, courts look beyond the success of an investment when
judging whether a trustee has violated the prudent man rule.32 These
courts recognize that "safety in income and principal are usually pri-
mary objectives to a qualified pension trust fund . . [and] ...a pru-
dent investor will not be solely concerned with capital growth."3 3 The
courts note that even though a trustee has not lost money on an invest-
ment, and in fact has received an "extraordinary" return, that does not
preclude a cause of action against the trustee for improperly risking
risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not
to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing
the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with
the provisions of this subchapter.
(2) In the case of an eligible individual account plan (as defined in sec-
tion 1 107(d)(3) of this title), the diversification requirement of paragraph
(I)(C) and the prudence requirement (only to the event that it requires
diversification) of paragraph (1)(B) is not violated by acquisition or hold-
ing of qualifying employer real property or qualifying employer securities
(as defined in section 1107(d)(4) and (5) of this title).
(b)Except as authorized by the Secretary by regulations, no fiduciary
may maintain the indicia of ownership of any assets of a plan outside the
jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States.
(c)In the case of a pension plan which provides for individual ac-
counts and permits a participant or beneficiary to exercise control over
assets in his account, if a participant or beneficiary exercises control over
the assets in his account (as determined under regulations of the Secre-
tary) -
(1) such participant or beneficiary shall not be deemed to be a fiduciary
by reason of such exercise, and
(2) no person who is otherwise a fiduciary shall be liable under this part
for any loss, or by reason of any breach, which results from such partici-
pant's or beneficiary's exercise of control.
ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982) (emphasis added).
31. G. BOGERT, Law of Trusts § 106, at 388 (1973).
32. See Marshall v. Glass/Metal Ass'n & Glaziers, 507 F. Supp. 378, 384 (D.
Hawaii 1980). "The application of ERISA's prudence standard does not depend upon
the ultimate outcome of an investment, but upon the prudence of the fiduciaries under
the circumstances prevailing when they make their decision and in light of the alterna-
tives available to them." But see American Com. Ass'n v. Retirement Plan, 488 F.
Supp. 479, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), "The mere fact that there may have been a decline in
the value of the Plan's portfolio or a diminution of income in a given year does not by
itself establish imprudent management."
33. A. ScoTT, The Law of Trusts § 227.1 (3d ed. 1967 & 1982 Supp.).
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pension trust assets.34 However, the prudent man rule, as it stands in
ERISA's fiduciary standard section, provides little help to the officer/
trustee faced with business conditions that dictate a managerial deci-
sion directly opposite to that officer's responsibilities as a trustee.
Added to the problems facing the officer/trustee are the requirements
of the diversification rule.
Unfortunately, the diversification rule fails to alleviate the di-
lemma faced by the officer/trustee in complying with the prudent man
rule. In pertinent part, the requirement to diversify provides that a plan
trustee must "diversify the investments of the plan so as to minimize
the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly pru-
dent not to do so."5 Ostensibly, the requirement to diversify is an at-
tempt by Congress to harness the discretion of the plan trustee who is
making investment decisions over the assets in the ERISA plan. Inter-
preting Congress' intent as enacted in the fiduciary standards section of
ERISA, the courts have been unable to produce uniform authority that
would clarify the ambiguity surrounding the requirement to diversify. 6
Although case precedent lacks uniformity in this area, the require-
ment to diversify remains the best strategy for prudent maintenance of
the trust corpus.37 Theoretically, the officer/trustee should aim to di-
versify its investment portfolio at a riskless posture, such that high
growth and risky potential investments may be offset by low growth
34. See supra note 31.
35. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (1982).
36. The Court in Marshall v. Teamsters, 458 F. Supp. at 986, determined that:
In some jurisdictions, lack of diversification is a per se breach of the trust-
ees' investment duty of prudence; in others it is not. Section 404(a)(1)(c)
requires diversification under circumstances where commitment of a high
percentage of the assets of a plan to a particular investment or class of
investments casts doubt on the prudence of the investments.
Teamsters, 458 F. Supp. at 990 (citations omitted).
Compare this finding with the rationale of the court in Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880
(2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983):
The circumstances surrounding a corporate decision are not easily recon-
structed in a courtroom years later, since business imperatives often call
for quick decisions, inevitably based on less than perfect information. The
entrepeneur's function is to encounter risks and to confront uncertainty,
and a reasoned decision at the time made may seem a wild hunch viewed
years later against a background of perfect knowledge.
Id.
37. See generally Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 77-
91. H. MARKOWITZ, Efficient Diversification of Investments, (1952). F. REILLEY, IN-
VESTMENTS, 633-54 (1982).
[Vol. 9
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and low risk investments to create a well-balanced base.38 The courts,
38. See F. REILLEY, INVESTMENTS 559-77 (1982).
Markowitz showed that the variance of the [investments] rate of re-
turn was a meaningful measure of risk under a reasonable set of assump-
tions and derived the formulas for computing the variance of the portfo-
lio. . . . The Markowitz model is based on several assumptions regarding
investor behavior:
(1) Investors consider each investment alternative as being repre-
sented by a probability distribution of expected returns over some holding
period.
(2) Investors maximize one-period expected utility and possess utility
curves that demonstrate diminishing marginal utility of wealth.
(3) Individuals estimate risk on the basis of the variability of expected
returns.
(4) Investors base decisions solely on expected return and risk; ie their
utility curves are a function of expected return an variance (or standard
deviation) of returns only.
(5) For a given risk level, investors prefer higher returns to lower re-
turns. Similarly, for a given level of expected return, investors prefer less
risk to more risk.
Id. at 559. Consider the following computation of the expected return for an individual
risky asset and the computation of the expected return of a portfolio.
Potential Expected
Probability Return (Pi)(%) Return (%)
.25 .08 .0200
.25 .10 .0250
.25 .12 .0300
.25 .14 .0350
E(R) = .1100
Weight (Wi) Expected Expected Portfolio
(% of the portfolio) Return (Ri) Return (Wi X Ri)
.20 .10 .0200
.30 .11 .0330
.30 .12 .0360
.20 .13 .0260
.1150
E(Rportfolio) = i=1 WiR
Variance (a2) = [Ri - E(Ri)]2 Pi
Ri  = possible (individual investment) rates of return
Wi  = weight (%) of the investment to the total portfolio
E(Ri) = expected rate of return (per individual investment)
Pi = probability of the possible rate of return
9
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however, apply the ERISA diversification requirement on an invest-
ment-by-investment basis, 9 which prevents plan trustees from pursuing
progressive portfolio management strategies that could ultimately pro-
vide greater return to the plan participant at the same low risk level. 40
Instead of looking at the rate of return earned after the particular in-
vestment progresses, courts assess diversification and prudence under
prevailing circumstances taken into account when the investment deci-
An envelope curve may be derived and plotted as the result of various combina-
tions of assets and portfolios (given the portfolio expected return and standard devia-
tions of each combination). "The envelope curve that contains the best of all combina-
tions is referred to as the efficient frontier. Specifically, the efficient frontier is that set
of portfolios that has the maximum return for every given level of risk or the mini-
mum risk for every level of return."
Id. at 577 (emphasis supplied).
39. The Markowitz portfolio theory considers the aggregate risk factor of the
portfolio as a measure of the investment manager's performance. Thus, this theory is
not based upon an investment-by-investment analysis. Markowitz, supra note 37, at 77-
91.
40. Id. See the example set forth in Joy.
Shareholders can reduce the volatility of risk by diversifying their hold-
ings. In the case of the diversified shareholder, the seemingly more risky
alternatives may well be the best choice since great losses in some stocks
will over time be offset by even greater gains in others:
INVESTMENT A
Estimated Probability Outcome Profit
of Outcome or Loss Value
.4 +15 6.0
.4 + 1 .4
.2 -13 -2.6
1.0 3.8
INVESTMENT A
Estimated Probability Outcome Profit
of Outcome or Loss Value
.4 + 6 2.4
.4 + 2 .8
.2 + 1 .2
1.0 3.4
Although A is clearly 'worth' more than B, it is riskier because it is
more volatile. Diversification lessens the volatility by allowing investors to
invest in 20 or 200 A's which will tend to guarantee a total result near the
value. Shareholders are thus better off with the various firms selecting A
over B, although after the fact they will complain in each case of the 2.6
loss.
Joy, 692 F.2d at 886 note 6 (quoting KLEIN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE
147-49 (1980)).
[Vol. 9
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sion began."1 This ambiguity between an accepted theory of finance
and judicial practice hinders the progressive officer/trustee seeking
high rates of return with slightly higher risk levels, because an invest-
ment-by-investment analysis will reject high risk projects at an earlier
stage than if the court had viewed that investment's risk factor in light
of the overall risk of the portfolio.42
The conflict between prudent trust practices and prudent corpo-
rate-profit maximization goals exists despite the issuance of a Depart-
ment of Labor regulation which attempts to define practical implemen-
tation for the diversification requirement.43 Although the Code of
Federal Regulations purports to illustrate factors that are consonant
with modern portfolio diversification theories, some of these elements
are incompatible to the judiciary's investment-by-investment analysis of
a trustee's capital spending decisions.44 Combined with the prudent
41. Withers v. Teachers' Retirement System, 47 F. Supp. 1248, 1255 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
42. See Markowitz, supra note 37 at 77-91.
43. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-l(B)(1) (1984)(investment duties). In pertinent part,
this Department of Labor regulation declares that:
(b) Investment Duties. (1) With regard to an investment or investment
course of action taken by a fiduciary of an employee benefit plan pursuant
to his investment duties, the requirement of section 1104 (a)(1)(B) of the
Act set forth in subsection (a) of this section is satisfied if the fiduciary:
(i) has given appropriate consideration to those facts and circumstances
that, given the scope of such fiduciary's investment duties, the fiduciary
knows or should know are relevant to the particular investment or invest-
ment course of action involved, including the role of investment or invest-
ment course of action plays in that portion of the plan's investment portfo-
lio with respect to which the fiduciary has investment duties; and (ii) has
acted accordingly.
2(ii) Consideration of the following factors as they relate to such portion
of the portfolio:
(A) The compensation of the portfolio with regard to diversification;
(B) The liquidity and current return of the portfolio relative to the antic-
ipated cash flow requirements of the plan; and
(C) The projected return of the portfolio relative to the funding objec-
tives of the plan.
44. In particular, § 2550.404a-l(b)(2)(ii)(C), when read alone, might allow
clearance to invest in a high risk security that complements the projected (expected)
return of the portfolio. But, an "investment by investment" approach could reject the
same investment.
Congress' endeavor to clarify its own diversification requirement was noted in the
legislative history:
The degree of investment concentration that would violate this require-
1985]
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man rule, this regulatory contradiction tends to increase the number of
the conflicting standards of fiduciary conduct that confront the officer/
trustee.45
B. Prohibited Transactions - Section 406
In addition to its fiduciary standard section, ERISA is designed to
prohibit transactions that involve transfers between an ERISA trustee
and a party-in-interest.46 Specifically, a fiduciary shall not:
ment to diversify cannot be stated as a fixed percentage, because a prudent
fiduciary must consider the facts and circumstances of each case. The fac-
tors to be considered include (1) the purposes of the plan; (2) the amont of
the plan assets; (3) financial and industrial conditions; (4) the type of in-
vestment, whether mortgages, bonds or shares of stock or otherwise; (5)
distribution as to geographical location; (6) distribution as to industries;
(7) the dates of maturity.
S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4639, 5084-85 (emphasis added).
45. Compare this finding with Teamsters, 458 F. Supp. at 986.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14) (1982) defines a "party-in-interest" as:
(A) any fiduciary (including but not limited to, any administrator, of-
ficer, trustee, or custodian), counsel, or employee of such employee benefit
plan;
(B) a person providing services to such plan;
(C) an employer any of whose employees are covered by such plan;
(D) an employee organization any of whose members are covered by
such plan;
(E) an owner, direct or indirect, of 50 percent or more of-
(i) the combined voting power of all ...
(ii) the capital interest or the profits interest in a partnership, or
(iii) the beneficial interest of a trust or unincorporated enterprise,
which is an employer or an employee organization described in subpara-
graph (C) or (D);
(F) a relative (as defined in paragraph 15 of any individual described in
subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E);
(G) a corporation, partnership, or trust or estate of which (or in which)
50 percent or more of -
(i) the combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote
or the total value of shares of all classes of stock of such corporation,
(ii) the capital interest or profits interest of such partnership, or -
(iii) the beneficial trust of such trust or estate is owned directly or
indirectly, or held by persons described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C),
(D), or (E);
(H) an employee, officer, director (or an individual having powers or re-
sponsibilities similar to those of officers or directors), or a 10 percent or
424 [Vol. 9
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(1) deal with the assets of the plan in his own interest or his own
account,
(2) in his individual or in any other capacity act in any transaction
involving the plan on behalf of a party (or represent a party) whose
interests are adverse to the interests of the plan or the interests of
its participants or beneficiaries, or
(3) receive any consideration for his own personal account from
any party dealing with such plan in connection with a transaction
involving the assets of the plan.47
more shareholder directly or indirectly, of a person described in subpara-
graph (B), (C), (D), (E), or (G), or of the employee benefit plan; or
(I) a 10 percent or more (directly or indirectly in a capital or profits)
partner or joint venturer of a person described in subparagraph (B), (C),
(D), (E), or (G).
The Secretary, after consultation and coordination with the Secretary
of the Treasury, may by regulation prescribe a percentage lower than 50
percent for subparagraph (E) and (G) and lower than 10 percent for sub-
paragraph (H) or (I). The Secretary may prescribe regulations for deter-
mining the ownership (direct or indirect) of profits and beneficial interests,
and the manner in which indirect stockholdings are taken into account.
Any person who is a party in interest with respect to a plan to which a
trust described in § 501(c)(22) of Title 26 is permitted to make payments
under § 1403 of this title shall be treated as a party in interest with respect
to such trust.
47. ERISA § 406(b)(1-3), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(1-3) (1982). In addition to §
1106, the Internal Revenue Code provides for a tax on prohibited transactions. In perti-
nent part, the I.R.C. taxes a "disqualified person" on each prohibited transaction.
§ 4975. Tax on prohibited transactions
(a) Initial taxes on disqualified person. - There is hereby imposed a tax
on each prohibited transaction. The rate of tax shall be equal to 5 percent
of the amount involved with respect to the prohibited transaction for each
year (or part thereof) in the taxable period. The tax imposed by this sub-
section shall be paid by any disqualified person who participates in the
prohibited transaction (other than a fiduciary acting only as such).
(b) Additional taxes on disqualified person. - In any case in which an
initial tax is imposed by subsection (a) on a prohibited transaction and the
transaction is not corrected within the taxable period, there is hereby im-
posed a tax equal to 100 percent of the amount involved. The tax imposed
by this subsection shall be paid by any disqualified person who participated
in the prohibited transaction (other than a fiduciary acting only as such).
A 'disqualified person' is defined as:
(2) Disqualified Person. - For purposes of this section, the term 'disqual-
ified person' means a person who is -
(A) a fiduciary;
(B) a person providing services to the plan;
(C) an employer any of whose employees are covered by the plan;
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Standing alone, section 406 appears to prohibit a trustee from ever
engaging in party-in-interest transactions. However, sections 407 and
408 provide the pension trustee an avenue to acquire or retain a limited
amount of employer securities for the pension plans."8 Unfortunately,
the officer/trustee, with ambitions to control the corporation, often mis-
understands these sections to imply a clear exception to the prohibited
transaction provision. 9
(D) an employee organization any of whose members are covered by
the plan;
(E) an owner, direct or indirect, of 50 percent or more of-
(i) the combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote
or the total value of shares of all classes of stock of a corporation,
(ii) the capital interest or the profits interest of a partnership, or
(iii) the beneficial interest of a trust or incorporated enterprise,
which is an employer or an employee organization described in subpara-
graph (C) or (D);
(F) a member of the family (as defined in paragraph (6)) of any
individual described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E);
(G) a corporation, partnership, or trust or estate or which (or in
which) 50 percent or more of-
(i) the combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote
or the total value of shares of all classes of stock of such corporation,
(ii) the capital interest or profits interest of such partnership, or
(iii) the beneficial interest of such trust or estate,
is owned directly or indirectly, or held by persons described in subpara-
graph (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E);
(H) an officer, director (or an individual having powers or responsi-
bilities similar to those of officers or directors), a 10 percent or more share-
holder, or a highly compensated employee (earning 10 percent or more of
the yearly wages of an employer) of a person described in subparagraph
(C), (D), (E), or (G); or
(I) a 10 percent or more (in capital or profits) partner or joint ven-
turer of a person described in subparagraph (C), (D), (E), or (G).
The Secretary, after consultation and coordination with the Secretary
of Labor or his delegate, may by regulation prescribe a percentage lower
than 50 percent for subpargraphs (E) and (G) and lower than 10 percent
for subparagraphs (H) and (I).
I.R.C. § 4975 (a),(b), (0(2) (1984).
This author does not intend to provide an exhaustive review of the I.R.C. provi-
sions for prohibited transactions of an ERISA trustee. Accordingly, the tax conse-
quences surrounding an ERISA trustee's conflict of interest abuse are beyond the scope
of this Note.
48. See ERISA § 407(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(2) (1982) ERISA §
408(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. 1108(e)(1) (1982).
49. The court in Donovan v. Bierwith rejected appellant's claim that § 1107 pro-
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C. Exceptions to the Prohibited Transactions Rule - Sections
407 and 408
Section 407(a)(2) establishes a loophole to ERISA's prohibited
transaction section. This loophole permits an ERISA plan trustee to
invest in "employer securities up to ten percent of the fair market value
of the assets in the plan."50 Section 408(e)(1) supplements this proviso
by exempting employer securities, if acquired for adequate considera-
tion, from sections 406 and 407.51 Thus, section 408(e)(1) acts as an
exemption to the 406 prohibited transaction rule. It is not surprising
that this limited exception is an attractive lure to an officer/trustee fac-
ing potential conflicts of interest. Along with the latent interpretational
problems presented to the officer/trustee in section 404's prudency
standards, this adequate consideration exception adds to the possibility
that a trustee will act as an officer to acquire corporate securities, while
using the trust corpus to track an imprudent venture in violation of his
fiduciary obligation to plan participants.
IV. Common Conflict of Interests Facing Officer/Trustees
A. Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Officer/Trustee's Use of Plan
Funds to Purchase Corporation.
In Eaves v. Penn, 2 an officer/trustee acquired employer stock us-
ing a mix of his personal and ERISA plan pension capital. The
purchase enabled him to establish majority shareholder control.13 The
vides an "unlimited" exception to § 1106's prohibited transaction standards. Bierwith,
680 F.2d at 271.
50. ERISA § 407(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(2) (1982).
51. ERISA § 408(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(e)(1) (1982) provides that:
(e) Sections 1106 and 1107 of this title shall not apply to the acqui-
sition or sale by a plan or qualifying employer securities (as defined in §
1107(d)(5) of this title) or acquisition, sale or lease by a plan of qualifying
employer real property (as defined in § 1107(d)(4) of this title-
(1) if such acquisition, sale, or lease is for adequate consideration
(or in the case of a marketable obligation, at a price not less favorable to
the plan than the price determined under § 1107(e)(1) of this title), (em-
phasis added).
Id.
52. 426 F. Supp. 830 (W.D. Okla. 1976), modified, (rem. on attorneys' fees is-
sue) 587 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1978).
53. Eaves, 587 F.2d at 453, 455.
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court examined the propriety of a purchase agreement entered into by
the trustee (Penn) of the employee stock ownership plan, and the cur-
rent majority shareholders (Eaves). As trustee of the pension plan,
Penn caused the transfer of $1,013,134.01 to the Eaveses for 6,807
shares of stock, 54 to be held by the substituted employee stock owner-
ship plan (ESOP)." Penn used his own capital to purchase the remain-
der of the majority shares from the Eaveses5 Penn compensated the
Eaveses for their stock holdings, and, through an amendment to the
company's original profit sharing plan that created an employee stock
ownership plan, 57 he transferred company assets into the new ESOP.58
This transfer occurred in the form of an advance payment from the
company's assets into the newly formed ESOP.59 By virtue of this elab-
orate transfer, Penn gained control over a majority amount of company
shares and designated himself a board member, vice-president and
treasurer of the target company, Glenns, Inc.60
Before the transfer and purchase, Glenns, Inc. maintained a strong
financial condition relative to its market place."' However, after Penn's
acquisition, leveraged by funds drawn from the ESOP,62 the value of
Glenns, Inc. shares experienced a decline by approximately $500,000.13
As a result of Penn's actions stockholder's equity declined from a pre-
acquisition value of $746,711 to a value of $76,000.4 The Tenth Cir-
cuit held that the officer/trustee's elaborate buyout scheme, fueled by
the amendment to the company's profit sharing plan, constituted a sec-
tion 404 breach of his fiduciary duties65 owed to that company's plan
participants and their beneficiaries. 6
54. Id. at 455.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 456.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals label Penn's transaction
with the substituted ESOP as a "prohibited transaction." Thus, the outgoing directors
were not treated as parties-in-interest with the substituted ESOP.
66. Id. at 454.
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1. Does ERISA Hold the Officer/Trustee to Unrealistic Expec-
tations, If Not Inequitable Standards?
Penn contended on appeal that, as a trustee, his fiduciary duty
bound him to the terms of the amended profit sharing plan, the ESOP,
and ERISA to "invest the Plan's fund in Employer's securities, unless
compliance was impossible, illegal or directly inconsistent with a spe-
cific prohibition of ERISA." 7 The court believed that this attempt to
define Penn's fiduciary role to the plan participants was putting the
cart before the horse. The court stated: "the premise for such a conten-
tion is based on the adoption of a uniform exemption for violations of
§ 1104 fiduciary standards in cases involving the discretionary activities
of an ESOP trustee. '6 8 Instead, this is really an instance where Penn
interpreted the breadth of the section 408(e) prohibited transaction ex-
ception to stand as a vanguard over section 404's fiduciary standard
section. It is established authority that section 408(e)'s limited excep-
tion should act as supplementary capacity in deference to section 404's
prudence and diversification requirements.6 9 The court adopted this
viewpoint and stated that, "[w]hile an ESOP trustee may be released
from certain per se violations . . ., the structure of the Act itself re-
quires that an ESOP fiduciary ... is governed by the 'solely in the
interest' and prudence tests of §§ 404(a)(1)(A) and (B)." 70
Although the Tenth Circuit found that Penn's capital acquisition
strategy violated ERISA's fiduciary standards section, his actions were
not uncommon when weighed against liberal principles of corporate fi-
nance.7 1 Arguably, if Penn had transferred capital from the amended
profit sharing plan into the ESOP and successfully gained control of
the company, this lawsuit may not have ensued. Although the courts
67. Id. at 458.
68. Id. at 459. ESOP refers to an employee stock ownership plan. See, I.R.C. §
4975(e)(7) (1984).
69. Eaves, 587 F.2d at 459, (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 5038:
Thus, while a plan may be able to acquire employers securities or real
property under the employers security rules, the acquisition must be for
the exclusive benefit of participants and beneficiaries. Consequently, if the
real property is acquired primarily to finance the employer, this would not
meet the exclusive benefit requirement.
Id. (Emphasis supplied).
70. Id.
71. See generally Brecher, Lazarus III, & Gray, The Function of Employee Re-
tirement Plans as an Impediment to Takeovers, 38 Bus. LAw 503 (1983).
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warn that a fiduciary's practices will be judged prospectively, 72 rather
than retrospectively, it is doubtful that a member of a successfully run
ESO P7 3 would sue the trustee of the plan and allege that that trustee
gained control of the company in an imprudent fashion.714 Thus, it is
likely that, had Penn's buyout inurred to the benefit of plan partici-
pants in the form of enhanced shareholder equity, Penn would still be
the vice-president, treasurer and board member of Glenn's, Inc. 75
Under slightly different circumstances, it is conceivable that an of-
ficer/trustee might sidestep a section 404 challenge to his disputed cap-
ital transfer by means of better corporate and managerial skills.
Favorable financial results, measured by an increase in shareholder's
equity, would appease the plan participants. When viewed retrospec-
tively, such a purchase plan might prove "solely to benefit plan partici-
pants" thereby satisfying the section 404 fiduciary standards. 76 Given
this hypothetical result, inequity in prosecutorial standards is likely to
occur.7 As long as corporate officers can act as plan trustees, there will
be circumstances when an officer/trustee may be tempted to manipu-
late the assets of the employee pension plan to suit his own business
interests. The trustee will do this with the belief that a somewhat im-
prudent strategy might result in enhanced wealth for the company
shareholders (who are also plan members) as well as advanced personal
power, wealth, and prestige for himself.
72. Withers, 47 F. Supp. at 1255.
73. The growth in an ESOP can be measured by the rate of return its invest-
ments experienced during a given time period.
74. But see Leigh v. Engle, 535 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. I1l. 1982), vacated rem, 727
F.2d 113 (7th Cir. 1984). In that case, members of a corporate profit sharing plan
brought suit for fiduciary breach by the trustees. The trust investments experienced an
"extraordinary" return, however, the participants' plan payments were deferred by the
trustees.
75. This conclusion is further buttressed by evidence of the District Court's find-
ing of facts. See Eaves, 426 F. Supp. at 830, 832-36.
76. Despite the court's holding in Leigh, 535 F. Supp. at 418, this author argues
that no cause of action would have been filed by the plan participants in the Eaves
action had: (1) Penn successfully managed the Glenns, Inc. and (2) all payments to
retired or withdrawn members were not deferred.
77. Specifically, imprudent uses of ESOP assets resulting in successful ventures
could not be prosecuted, while unsuccessful investments would instigate actions for fi-
duciary breach.
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B. An Officer/Trustee's Investment Decisions Track Indepen-
dent Investment Group's Acquisition Plans.
In Leigh v. Engle,7 8 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held
that two officer/trustees' actions in three separate investment acquisi-
tion plans violated the fiduciary standards section of ERISA.79 The dis-
puted transactions involved investment decisions that were made by
trustees of the Reliance Manufacturing Corporation's Employees Profit
Sharing Trust.80 The officer/trustees, who were also members of an ac-
quisition group, directed trust capital to finance the acquisition aspira-
tions of the group. 81 Each investment by the trust precluded an attempt
by the group to purchase large blocks of that company's stock.82 Thus,
despite an extraordinary return on investment, the trustees' use of trust
capital to track the group's acquisition attempts violated their fiduciary
responsibilities pursuant to section 404.83
The investment group consisted of various individuals representing
three different corporations: Libco Corporation, GSC Corporation, and
Reliable Manufacturing.84 The head of the group, a financier, and
CEO of Libco and GSC, did not act alone. He received assistance from
the chief counsel for Libco, who was the administrator of the Reliable
Trust (Employee pension plan), the president of Reliable Manufactur-
ing, who was also co-administrator of the trust, and an investment ana-
lyst hired by Libco.85 This group centered its acquisition attempts on
the three companies: Berkeley Bio Medical, Outdoor Sports Industries,
and the Hickory Furniture Company.8
As a white knight,8 7 the financier purchased approximately 60,000
78. Leigh, 535 F. Supp. at 418.
79. Leigh, 727 F.2d at 116.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 117.
82. Id. at 118.
83. Id. at 128.
84. Id. at 116.
85. Id. at 117.
86. Id. at 116.
87. White knight is the colloquialism for a third, independent company that is
solicited by the firm whose stock is being pursued by the acquiring firm. Usually, the
third firm (the white knight) enters into an agreement with the firm that is being pur-
sued. Often the pursued firm negotiates an exchange of its stock for the efforts of the
third party to buy a large number of shares and thereby defeat the acquiring firm's
attempt at gaining control of the pursued company. See American General Ins. Co. v.
Equitable General Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721, 732 n.19 (E.D. Va. 1980).
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shares of Berkeley stock prior to the investment group meeting in an
attempt to prevent a hostile tender offer88 by Cooper Industries, the
firm intending to takeover control of Berkely.89 Following a meeting of
the investment group, the Reliable trust purchased 15,000 shares of
Berkeley stock.90 After the pension plan's purchase, the financier sent
correspondence to other Berkeley block shareholders, in an attempt to
solicit either their interests in the stock or their proxy in upcoming
Berkeley board meetings.91 This attempt was the result of opposition to
the ongoing talks between Berkeley and Cooper Industries, the com-
pany that had set forth its initial tender offer.92 Eventually, the finan-
cier withdrew his complaint, negotiated the tender of its holdings to
Cooper, and realized a "substantial profit for its Berkeley stock
interests."9
The group's investment in the OSI Corporation assumed a pattern
similar to the Berkeley coup.94 Again, the trust administrators tracked
the investment group's acquisition plans by purchasing 12,400 shares of
OSI stock.95 Subsequent to this purchase, the investment group, headed
by its financier, battled the present OSI management for managerial
control.96 The tender fight ended when a white knight sided with OSI
management and offered fifteen dollars per share to the investment
group for their OSI stock holdings.97 The group responded by selling its
shares to the white knight at a one hundred forty-one percent profit.98
The investment group was less successful in their acquisition of Hick-
ory Furniture. Following the investment group's purchase of 51,400
88. See A. Fleischer, Jr., Tender Offers: Defenses, Responses and Planning 99
(1978):
A tender or exchange offer is aimed directly at the shareholders of the
target. The bidder may make an offer irrespective of director opposition if
it complies with all the legal standards., Unlike the situation in a merger
or sale of assets transaction, in which the board of directors must approve
and recommend the transaction, the shareholders can respond directly to
the offer.
89. Id. 727 F.2d at 119.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 121.
92. Id. at 120.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 121.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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shares, the Reliable trustees bought 8,000 shares of Hickory stock.99
After the trust's purchase, the investment group became members of
the Hickory Board of Directors, and the trust then sold its shares at a
four percent profit.100
1. Should a Trustee Refuse to Act Upon Inside Information
Made Available to Him Vis-A-Vis His Corporate Position
As An Officer?
The Seventh Circuit in Leigh found that ERISA is not concerned
with the success of a trust's investment.101 This finding is consistent
with the Congressional intent to preserve the trust corpus through com-
mon-law trust principles.10 2 Indeed, the Leigh court found that Reliable
trustees' activities were "self dealing" and lacked prudence as required
by ERISA's fiduciary standards.1 03 Thus, the investment group's suc-
cessful investments, resulting in an increase in shareholder equity for
plan participants, are suspect to ERISA's prohibited transaction sec-
tion, as well as to the Act's fiduciary standards. 0 Because the invest-
ments were not "made with an 'eye single' to the interests of the Plan
participants, they lacked the necessary objectivity and prudence pre-
scribed by ERISA."10 By labeling the trustees' actions "self-dealing,"
the court chooses to apply a broad interpretation to "section 406's re-
striction on officer/trustees of either the 'target' or 'raider' (corpora-
tion) who have a significant interest of their own in the outcome of the
contests.106
The Leigh court suggested that, the Reliable trustees may have
avoided violating ERISA's fiduciary standards if the trustees had con-
sulted with independent counsel, instead of an interested party.10 7 Jux-
taposed against other case precedent, this suggestion provides little hint
of a touchstone by which the officer/trustee may measure future invest-
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 122, n.17, 123. S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted
in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4639, 5186 (Statement of Sen. Harrison
Williams).
103. Id. at 132.
104. Id. at 132-134.
105. Id. at 129.
106. See generally Id. at 132-36.
107. Id. at 132.
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ment decisions. Additionally, one authority on the law of trusts ob-
served that:
In reaching his conclusion [the trustee] may take into consideration
advice given to him by attorneys, bankers, brokers, and others
whom prudent men in the community regard as qualified to give
advice. He is not justified, however, in relying wholly upon the ad-
vice of others, since it is his duty to exercise his own judgment in
the light of the information and advice which he receives.' 08
In Leigh, the investment group relied solely on the advice solicited
from the investment advisor.' 0 9 The court found that this advice came
from an interested party and lacked the prudence required by
ERISA."l0 The Leigh decision revitalizes the catch-22 atmosphere sur-
rounding the officer/trustee. Specifically, that atmosphere consists of
an improper mix of goal oriented expectations; in one corner stands the
profit maximizing employee, while on the other side is the prudent
trustee.
The Leigh court adopts the Department of Labor suggestion that
trustees in this situation should abdicate their roles as trustees and
"turn over the administration of the plan to another who can set forth a
prudent investment course independent of that trustee's other inter-
ests.""' The Department of Labor's suggestion is theoretically sound,
but based on the premise that an officer/trustee will always recognize a
situation that constitutes ERISA's fiduciary self-dealing. 112 When it is
proven that the officer/trustee will ignore standards and use pension
funds to self-deal, it follows that logic will not dictate that the same
officer/trustee resign his position"' for the sake of prudence." 4 In Don-
108. A. SCOTT, supra note 33.
109. Leigh, 727 F.2d at 132-35.
110. Id. at 132.
111. Id.
112. Semantic problems arise when the courts struggle to consider whether an
action is "self-dealing." Is this an unfair label to affix upon the officer/trustee acting
upon confidential information? Had Goldman, Sachs & Company circulated a "buy"
opinion sheet to its investing customers suggesting that Berkeley appeared to be an
attractive purchase, would the Reliable trustee's purchase be prudent? Here, ERISA
and the courts shed little light on the way in which an officer/trustee may ever insulate
himself from charges of fiduciary breach, while making an attractive investment for the
trust plan.
113. See Leigh, 727 F.2d at 132.
114. Congress assesses penalties against breaching fiduciaries by: (1) awarding
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ovan v. Cunningham,15 the court adopts section 408(e)'s adequate con-
sideration requirement116 as the test for an officer/trustee's prudence
over his investment decisions. The Cunningham court held that "ESOP
fiduciaries will carry their burden to prove . . [the payment of] ...
adequate consideration . . .[established by] ...prudent investigation
in the prevailing circumstances"11 7 However, this interpretation un-
earths little knowledge, because the standard of prudence expected of
the officer/trustee is left as an undefined principle. It follows that the
adoption of an adequate consideration standard fails to extricate the
officer/trustee from the catch-22 situation encountered by the trustees
in the Leigh case.
C. Fiduciary Breach By an Officer/Trustee in the Midst of a
Corporate Tender Offer.
ERISA's fiduciary standards section plays an important role in
judging the actions of an officer/trustee's investment decision to tender,
or refuse to tender, corporate securities held by the employee stock
ownership plan. In Donovan v. Bierwirth, 18 the court evaluated the
prudence of the trustee who refused to tender corporate securities and
instead, decided to buy company securities in an attempt to ward off
the bid of an acquiring firm. 19
Board members of the Grumman Corporation voted to prevent a
tender offer by the LTV Corp.120 Following this board meeting, all
ESOP participants received a memorandum informing them that their
compensatory damages pursuant to ERISA § 1109, infra note 158; and (2) assessing
tax penalties against "disqualified" persons, I.R.C. § 4975, supra n. 45. As these provi-
sions failed to deter the trustees in Eaves and Leigh from breaching their fiduciary
duty to plan participants, it would seem that these provisions are not realistic. Further,
these penalties may fail to compensate plan participants in the event that the breaching
fiduciary is insolvent. See, infra notes 160-2 and accompanying text.
115. Donovan v. Cunningham, 541 F. Supp. 276 (S.D. Tex. 1982), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, rev. in part, 716 F.2d 1455 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. den., - U.S.-_
104 S. Ct. 3533 (1984).
116. Cunningham, 716 F.2d at 1465.
117. Id. at 1467-68.
118. Donovan v. Bierwith, 538 F. Supp. 463 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), 680 F.2d 263 (2d.
Cir. 1982), cert. den. 459 U.S. 1069 (1982).
119. Id. at 466. "In this lawsuit, the ESOP officer/trustee's decision to retain
Grumman stock while purchasing additional stock on the open market, did not consti-
tute a prohibited transaction."
120. Id.
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plan held one third of Grumman outstanding stock. The memorandum
provided that "these plans are managed by Grummanites who will look
long and hard at how well their fellow members would be served by
selling off Grumman stock. '121 One month later, Grumman trustees
decided to refuse the tender offer for any of the shares held by the
pension plan.122 Instead, the trustees voted to purchase an additional
1,275,000 shares of Grumman stock in an attempt to maintain control
and defeat LTV's acquisiton attempt. 23 The trustees based this
purchase decision on an investment outlook report by Dillon, Read &
Company, an investment banking concern retained by Grumman. 24
The District Court viewed the recommendation of Dillon, Read &
Company as constituting "no real inquiry into the dangers presented to
the Pension plan in the event of a takeover,. . . [instead]. . . the trus-
tee's imprudence formed a policy of 'conscious avoidance' to any posi-
tive effects that the LTV tender offer could enhance shareholder
wealth."'1 25 The court ruled that "the trustees were not justified in rely-
ing upon the advice of Dillon, Read & Co. since that company had
provided investment banking services to Grumman in the past, includ-
ing acting as a manager of an offering of its convertible subordinated
debentures in April, 1980. '' 126 In support of its finding that Dillon,
Read & Company had an "obvious interest in Grumman's continuing
independence,"' 2 7 the court stated that:
In relying upon the advice of another, he [the trustee] should con-
sider whether the person giving the advice is disinterested. Thus, it
has been held that in purchasing securities for the trust he is not
justified in relying solely on the advice of a broker interested in the
sale of the securities."'128
Accordingly, the Grumman trustees' decision to retain company securi-
ties and purchase additional stock, combined with their failure to seek
impartial investment advice and constituted a breach of section 404.129
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 472.
125. Id. at 474 (emphasis added).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 475 (emphasis added).
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On appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the Grumman
trustees argued that their actions did not arise under §1106's prohib-
ited transactions self-dealing provision.130 In support of this argument,
the trustees quoted a 1973 statement by the Department of Labor
before the Senate Finance Committee.131 In pertinent part, this state-
ment provided that:
Since such an employer will often be an administrator of his plan,
or will function as a trustee or in some other fiduciary capacity,
this provision [§1107(a)(3)] creates a limited exception to the
listed proscription against self-dealing. The exception is made in
recognition of the symbiotic relationship existing between the em-
ployer and the plan covering his employees.132
Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that the Grumman trustees did
not violate the prohibited transaction section of ERISA by following a
course of action which "benefits the corporation as well as the benefi-
ciaries. 1 33 However, the Second Circuit did find that the trustees' ac-
tions were not made at all times with "an eye single to the interests of
the plan participants and their beneficiaries," which constituted a
breach of §1404's fiduciary standards. 34
In retrospect, the Grumman officer/trustees' predicament is under-
standable in light of practical business considerations minimized by the
Second Circuit. Realistically, Bierwirth and the other trustees acted in
their official capacity as corporate officers when they decided to defeat
the LTV tender offer. According to testimony in the district court, this
decision is consistent with management's stated belief that LTV, pursu-
ant to a successful tender offer, would replace existing Grumman man-
agement with LTV designees.13 5 Under this assumption, Grumman
trustees believed that any new management implemented by LTV
would create a negative impact on shareholder equity, thereby posing a
threat to the Employee Benefit Plan holdings.138 The Second Circuit
130. Bierwith, 680 F.2d at 271.
131. See id. at 271 (quoting Private Pension Reform: Hearings Before the Sub-
com. on Private Pension Plans of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93 Cong., 1st Sess.
446 (1973) (statement of Department of Labor).
132. Donovan v. Bierwith, 680 F.2d at 271.
133. Id. at 271-72.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 275.
136. Even though LTV did not announce that Grumman's executives would be
displaced upon the success of its tender offer, a majority of hostile takeovers end with
1985]
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empathized with this concern in light of a debt ridden LTV.137 Never-
theless, the Second Circuit focused its attention on the Grumman trust-
ees' decision to purchase additional Grumman stock and cautioned that
they:
should have realized that their judgment ... would be biased and
accordingly they should take. . . every feasible precaution to free
themselves. . . from any taint of the quick negative reaction char-
acteristic of targets of hostile tender offers . . .(and) consider the
huge risks attendant with purchasing additional Grumman shares
at a price substantially elevated by the tender offer.138
In other words, the Grumman trustees should have insulated them-
selves from any reaction that might be aligned with the normal reac-
tion of a corporate decision maker.
1. Bendix-Martin Marietta: A Solution to the Dual Loyalty
Problem?
Another conflict arose when Bendix made a hostile tender offer to
acquire outstanding stock in the Martin Marietta corporation. 139
Thereafter, Martin Marietta counter-offered for Bendix' outstanding
stock.140 During this tender battle, Bendix plan trustees held eleven
percent of outstanding Bendix stock, in the Bendix Salaried Employees
Savings and Stock Ownership Plan (BSESSOP). The plan trustees sold
four million five hundred thousand shares to Martin Marietta, at
tender price, thereby "carry[ing] out its fiduciary responsibility by pre-
serving 'all options' for the plan and its participants.11 41 Citibank of
New York acted as the independent manager to Bendix' employee
the acquiring company substituting its chosen officials in place of the acquired com-
pany's executives. Note, The Duties of Employee Benefit Plan Trustee under ERISA
in Hostile Tender Offers, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1692, 1703 (1982).
137. Bierwith, 680 F.2d at 276.
138. Id.
139. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. The Bendix Corp., No. 82-7669 (2d Cir.,
September 21, 1982)). Wall Street Journal, Sept. 14, 1982, at 4, col.l; Sept. 17, 1982,
at 2, col.2; Sept. 20, 1982, at 2, col.2; Sept. 21, 1982, at 2, col.2.
140. Wall Street Journal, Sept. 21, 1982 at 2, col.2. See also Martin Marietta
Corp. v. The Bendix Corp., supra note 139.
141. Wall Street Journal, Sept. 21, 1982, at 2, col.2. See also New York Times,
Sept. 24, 1982, at Dl, col.5.
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stock ownership plan. 42 To challenge the independent trustee's decision
to tender, Bendix filed for a temporary restraining order in federal dis-
trict court.1 43 The district court did not issue the temporary restraining
order against the Citibank asset plan manager. To the contrary, the
district court judge ordered the plan manager to carry out his original
decision to tender Bendix stock to Martin Marietta. 1" On a motion for
rehearing and modification, Bendix argued that ninety-four percent of
the shareholders instructed the Citibank manager to withdraw the
tender.145 The court, however, refused to modify its original order.1 46
One could argue that a tender offer made solely in the interest of
the plan participants would never have occured had a Bendix officer/
trustee managed the Plan. Instead, an independent qualified asset
plan manager accepted the tender, satisfying his fiduciary responsibility
to the members of the plan without any outside conflict of loyalties
impacting upon that decision. This is the ultimate goal of the fiduciary
policy guidelines set forth in ERISA.
V. Judicial Standard of Review that Gauges a Trustee's
Prudence in Administering Plan Assets
Federal courts have firmly established that the actions of a trustee
over the management of an ERISA Plan are to be analyzed on the
basis of "whether those actions were arbitrary and capricious in light of
the trustees' responsibility to all potential beneficiaries. 1 48 In Fine v.
Semet, 49 for example, a district court held that the actions of the
142. Wall Street Journal, Sept. 21, 1982, at 2, col.2.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Accordingly, the court in Leigh observed that:
Otherwise, the risk is too great that the trustee will come to a crossroads .
where the interests of the plan and the party-in-interest diverge. For exam-
ple, while the party-in-interest may be seeking to accumulate as many
shares as possible in order to maintain or acquire control, a plan's inter-
est in maximizing its investment return may require it to tender its shares
to a competing bidder for shares.
Leigh, 727 F.2d at 132 (emphasis added).
148. Rueda v. Seafarers Union, 576 F.2d 939, 942 (1st Cir. 1978).
149. Fine v. Semet, 514 F. Supp. 34 (S.D. Fla. 1981), aff'd, 699 F.2d 1091 (11th
Cir. 1983).
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trustees are consistent with their fiduciary duties under ERISA. 150 In
support of this finding, the court noted that the partner/trustee's con-
cern about the impact of an immediate lump-sum payment to a depart-
ing law firm partner was well founded and rested on the consideration
"that a sudden loss of some fourteen percent of the Plan's assets, com-
bined with the significant potential for additional requests for immedi-
ate payments could not be acts of an arbitrary or capricious nature.'151
150. Id. at 42-43. The District Court considered the decision of the profit sharing
trustee not to allow a departing partner to withdraw his lump-sum benefit from plan
assets. The plan documents provided that:
Upon termination of a Participant's employment prior to attaining Normal
Retirement Age (for any reason other than death or disability), a Partici-
pant may elect, upon the consent of the Advisory Committee, to direct the
Trustee to commence payment to the Participant of his Nonforfeitable Ac-
crued Benefit prior to the Participant's attaining Normal Retirement Age.
The Advisory Committee must give its direction to the Trustee on or
before the last day of the Plan Year in which the Participant first incurs a
Break in Service as a result of the termination of his employment. . . .If
the terminating Participant is one hundred percent (100%) vested in his
Accrued Benefit by the close of the Plan Year in which his employment
terminates, the Advisory Committee, in its sole discretion, may direct the
Trustee to commence payment to the Participant of his Accrued Benefit
within sixty (60) days after the close of the Plan Year in which the Par-
ticipant's employment terminates without regard to the Participant's incur-
ring a Break in Service. ...
If the Advisory Committee does not give the Trustee a direction to com-
mence payment, the Trustee shall continue to hold the Participant's Ac-
crued Benefit in trust until the close of the Plan Year in which the Partici-
pant attains Normal Retirement Age. At that time, the Trustee shall
commence payment of the Participant's Nonforfeitable Accrued Benefit in
accord with the provisions of Article VI. ...
If the Participant terminates employment prior to attaining Normal Re-
tirement Age because of death or disability, the Advisory Committee shall
direct the Trustee to commence payment of the Participant's Accrued
Benefit to him (or to his Beneficiary if the Particiant is deceased), in ac-
cord with the provisions of Section 6.02, within sixty (60) days after the
close of the Plan Year in which the Participant's employment terminates.
[Deleted portions relate to date payment is to be made if directed by Advi-
sory Committee, calculation of benefits at the close of a plan year, and
alternative provisions for payment of benefits in case of death or
disability].
Fine v. Semet, 514 F. Supp. at 37-38 (emphasis supplied). After it conducted a fair
reading of the plan documents, the court determined that the trustee's actions were not
"arbitrary or capricious."
151. Id.
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The fourteen percent reduction that would result from the partner's
withdrawal augmented the trustee's concern over assessing future in-
vestment goals and over potential financial loss to remaining plan par-
ticipants.15 2 Thus, the retention of the departing employee's funds cre-
ated a very realistic concern to the maintenance of the trust corpus.
The court reasoned that an act can be "arbitrary and capricious"
if "invalid preferences" are proven to exist.153 Such preferences are es-
tablished "not merely on a showing of dissimilar treatment, but on dis-
similar treatment based on 'improper purpose' or irrational effect." 15'
Because the trustees' acts had a valid purpose, grounded in the rational
effect that benefitted remaining plan members, they did not act in an
arbitrary or capricious nature.1 55
The Fine court's application of an arbitrary or capricious test in
connection with "invalid preferences" or "irrational effects" should
provide the judiciary with an uniform test to interpret the actions of an
officer/trustee. Although the ERISA fiduciary responsibility section
does not expressly mention the arbitrary or capricious standard, the
federal judiciary should adopt this standard in conflict of interest cases.
Such a uniform standard is clearly lacking in cases like Donovan v.
Bierwirth,5M Eaves v. Penn,1 57 and Leigh v. Engle. 1 5 The arbitrary or
capricious standard, however, is only a post facto solution because it
fails to curb an officer/trustee's fiduciary breach at its genesis - con-
flict of interest. Therefore, Congress must adopt a uniform policy that
will rid ERISA pension plans of the conflicts that inevitably result
when a trustee acts in dual capacities for the plan and in the manage-
ment of the corporation. This proposed Congressional policy will save
company plan assets from the dissipation that results due to an officer/
trustee's dual loyalties that eventually lead to fiduciary breach.
VI. ERISA's Provision for Relief from Fiduciary Breach Fails
to Protect Plan Participants From Loss
If an officer/trustee's actions are clearly in violation of ERISA's
152. Id.
153. Id. at 44.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. at 463.
157. See Eaves, 426 F. Supp. at 830.
158. See Leigh, 535 F. Supp. at 418.
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fiduciary standards, it is likely that adequate redress will not be availa-
ble to plan participants and their beneficiaries. Section 409(a) of
ERISA provides in pertinent part that: "Any person who is a fiduciary
with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obliga-
tions, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this title shall be personally
liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from
each such breach". 159
In Freund v. Marshall & llsley Bank,160 pension trustees breached
their fiduciary duties, and the court ordered that they be jointly and
severally liable to restore to the plan $464,925.95, the amount ad-
judged to constitute damages of their breach.""' Plan participants' ben-
eficiaries might survive dissipation if the trustees can satisfy the court's
judgment. On the average, officer/trustees who are guilty of a breach
involving millions of lost plan dollars surely cannot restore such
amounts to the plan. The corporation need not indemnify "bad faith"
fiduciaries in such cases.'6 2 Thus plan participants are exposed to catos-
159. ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1109(a) (1982).
160. Freund, 485 F. Supp. at 636.
161. Id. at 633-35.
162. However, some state corporation acts provide for the indemnification of of-
ficers, directors, employees, and agents. Fla. Stat. § 607.014(1)(1984), provides:
607.014 Indemnification. of officers, directors, employees, and
agents. -
(1) A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person who
was or is a party, or is threatened to be made a party, to any threatened,
pending, or completed action, suit, or proceeding, whether civil, criminal,
administrative, or investigative (other than an action by, or in the right of,
the corporation), by reason of the fact that he is or was a director, officer,
employee, or agent of the corporation or is or was serving at the request of
the corporation as a director, officer, employee, or agent of another corpo-
ration, partnership, joint venture, trust, or other enterprise against ex-
penses (including attorneys' fees), judgments, fined, and amounts paid in
settlement actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection with
such action, suit, or proceeding, including any appeal thereof, if he acted
in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in, or not
opposed to, the best interests of the corporation and, with respect to any
criminal action or proceeding, had no reasonable cause to believe his con-
duct was unlawful. The termination of any action, suit, or proceeding by
judgment, order, settlement, or conviction or upon a plea of nolo con-
tendere or its equivalent shall not, of itself, create a presumption that the
person did not act in good faith and in a manner which he reasonably
believed to be in, or not opposed to, the best interests of the corporation or,
with respect to any criminal action or proceeding, had reasonable cause to
believe that his conduct was unlawful.
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trophic losses if the officer/trustee cannot satisfy a court order that he
compensate the plan for his fiduciary breach.
VII. Conclusion
In a statement before the Subcommittee on Labor, United States
Representative John Erlenborn of Illinois referred to ERISA as "the
subject of derision, inasmuch as the acronym has come to stand for
'Every Ridiculous Idea Since Adam.' 1613 It is apparent that Section
408(c)(3)'s provision that allows an officer of a corporation to act as a
trustee over that company's pension plan adds impetus to Representa-
tive Erlenborn's statement."" As the cases reviewed in this note demon-
strate, it is often impractical to allow an officer with loyalties divided
between the goals of his corporation and the interests of the plan par-
ticipants open access to a highly liquid source of capital. Specifically,
section 404 requires that an officer/trustee set aside his daily corporate
obligations (that often include his own job security)1 65 and abide by
common-law trust prudency standards. 66
Additionally, the trustee cannot gauge his investment decisions
with only one uniform standard of conduct. As the "adequate consider-
ation" standard is based upon prudence,167 it fails to provide one con-
sistent regulatory standard to measure the trustee's investment deci-
sions. Confronted with case precedent and the Department of Labor's
diversification standards, the officer/trustee is left with a mass of con-
flicting standards.
The Department of Labor proposes that a officer/trustee resign his
administration upon discovery of possible "self-dealing" circum-
Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, in Florida, if the officer/trustee acts in "good faith" by administering the plan in
the "best interests" of the corporation, he may be indemnified for the resultant loss to
plan participants. However, the Florida Act has no provision for the corporate indemni-
fication of officer/trustee's "bad faith" breach.
163. Retirement Income Incentives Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 1541 Before the
Senate Sub. Comm. on Labor of the Sen. Comm. on Human Resources, 97 Cong., 1
Sess. 846-54 (1982)(statement by U.S. Representative John Erlenborn).
164. Section 1108(c)(3) adds impetus to Representative Erelenborn's statement,
as it allows an officer/trustee access to a position where he will surely encounter con-
flicts of interest that could threaten plan asset security.
165. See supra note 136.
166. See ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982).
167. Compare § 1104 with § 1108(e).
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stances. 168 Though this suggestion might avoid fiduciary breach, it is
based on the unrealistic supposition that a officer/trustee can recognize
situations constituting conflicts of interest. While the judiciary can
adopt a uniform "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review to deter-
mine whether an officer/trustee actually breached his fiduciary duties,
it is a post facto solution.
The best solution available to Congress is to repeal section
408(c)(3) and disallow an officer of the corporation from acting in a
dual capacity as an ERISA trustee. In its place, Congress should enact
a substitute section that provides for a two-tiered investment counsel-
ling requirement. All ERISA plans with assets over $2,550,000 must
employ the services of an ERISA investment manager,16 9 while those
plans with assets below this mark need not abide by this requirement.
As in Bendix v. Martin Marietta,170 such a plan manager will be able
to administer plan assets independent of ongoing corporate activity,
thereby eliminating the difficulties inherent in allowing an officer access
over the administration of an ERISA pension plan. Nevertheless an
168. See Leigh, 727 F.2d at 132.
169. This $2,550,000 allowance is determined by: $17,000 [I.R.S. Employer/
Employee Joint Contribution Allowance to Individual Retirement Account] x 150 em-
ployees (average number of employees based upon U.S. Census Report on Employer
Benefits in Medium and Large Firms). See I.R.C. §§ 219(a), (b)(1) and (b)(2);
1371(a)(3) (1985). STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 437, (104th ed.
1984). ERISA defines an investment manager as:
any fiduciary (other than a trustee or named fiduciary, as defined in §
1102(a)(2) of this title) -
(A) who has the power to manage, acquire, or dispose of any asset
of a plan;
(B) who is (i) registered as an investment adviser under the Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940; (ii) is a bank, as defined in that Act; or (iii) is
an insurance company qualified to perform services described in subpara-
graph (A) under the laws of more than one State; and)
(C) has acknowledged in writing that he is a fiduciary with respect
to the plan.
ERISA § 3(38), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(38) (1982). See also Shilling, The CFO's Potential
Fiduciary Liability under ERISA, CFO., March 1985, at 65-6. A CFO (Chief Finan-
cial Officer) who names an ERISA investment manager to administer plan assets may
be liable to plan participants or their beneficiaries for fiduciary breach if: "(1) the CFO
participates :n or conceals a breach of fiduciary duty; (2) the CFO knows of a breach
but does nothing to remedy it; or (3) the CFO's failure to carry out his other duties
[i.e. failure to choose the investment manager prudently] made the breach possible."
Id.
170. See Wall Street Journal, Sept. 21, 1982, at 2, col.2.
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officer may act as a trustee to plans with assets under $2,550,000. This
allowance is contingent on the stringent requirement that the officer/
trustee, upon discovery of a "questionable transaction," 171 seek the ad-
vice of an ERISA investment manager. The incentive for this response
is a clear exemption from any resultant fiduciary breach or imprudent
action that might arise out of the "questionable transaction."
David L Weiss
171. In light of the potential for conflict of interest, this author would define a
"questionable transaction" as one that is clearly violative of accepted corporate invest-
ment practice; according to Markowitz's portfolio theory, such an investment clearly
upsets the balance of risk already maintained in the plan's portfolio. See generally
Markowitz, supra note 7, at 77-91.
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